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 Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to draw together in one place knowledge that is 
relevant to the possible role of RFID (radio frequency identification) in contractor 
monitoring.  The paper uses multiple case studies and internet survey methods to 
explore several issues in RFID-enabled monitoring of contractors.  It also offers 
some conceptual frameworks to help decision makers think through ways RFID 
might emerge as a contractor monitoring technology as well as some of the key 
reasons for using this mechanism of monitoring.  The paper concludes with research 
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 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to draw together in one place knowledge that is 
relevant to the possible role of RFID (radio frequency identification) in contractor 
monitoring, i.e. to attempt to pull together what we know about this issue at the 
current point in time. The scope of the paper is limited to non-combat military 
contracting.  The content of the paper is mainly empirical: I will use multiple case 
studies and internet survey methods to explore what I see as the important issues in 
monitoring contractors, some of which turn out to be quite general. For example, it is 
impossible to use RFID for collecting information on contractors without also 
invading the privacy of individuals that are tagged. Because individuals’ rights to 
privacy are defended constitutionally, normatively and by the actions of special 
interest groups, I explore privacy issues in the paper at some length. After all, RFID 
tagging will only generate information if contractors wear the tags; and even then 
some information may be illegal to use or its use might be eliminated by contract 
provisions. 
Monitoring issues are endemic in any contractual relationship.  Take a routine 
service such as hiring a nanny to watch small children while parents are at work.  
How will we know the service has been performed properly and to our 
specifications? How can we monitor it in order to tell?  How will we know if we have 
been over-billed? Traditionally parents might have relied on a variety of mechanisms 
to “police” their nanny, such as spot checks, job screening and social reputation.  
But in recent years parents have begun to apply new technology to the nanny 
monitoring problem too, by installing “nanny cams” that enable them to watch home 
from work, via the internet. The example – deliberately chosen because it is 
mundane – highlights two issues in monitoring.  First, monitoring is costly because it 
requires a monitor; and second, new technologies are emerging that make it 
possible to monitor more efficiently. 
Of course, the costs of monitoring contractors are hardly new. In ancient 
Egypt the Pharoah Khasekem faced the problem of how to monitor food distribution 
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 among 100,000 men working on pyramid construction.  He had to hire a battery of 
administrators just to account for food rations, so that some workers could not 
successfully take more than their daily food allowance. This meant developing the 
ability to individually identify workers, and account for food rations given to them. 
Then, as now, the costs of monitoring were apparent in the cost of administrative 
personnel and systems that were necessary in order to monitor worker behavior 
(Ezzamel, 2004).  
The use of technologies in monitoring is not a new insight either: weighing 
and measuring technologies have always influenced how goods are sold, a well-
known example being de Beers method of batching rough diamonds and selling 
them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (Foss and Foss, 2005).  Technology availability 
governs what kinds of contracts are possible by affecting what kinds of monitoring is 
possible, and therefore how work might be optimally organized. Among new 
technologies, video is one way of monitoring, but there are others. Software cookies 
monitor internet surfers’ by tracking their “clicks” as they browse the web, and in the 
process generate information about an individual’s movement around the internet.  
RFID (radio frequency identification) tags worn by individuals generate “reads” every 
time they pass an RFID reader, in the process generating information about an 
individual’s movement in the real world. It is not unrealistic to therefore suggest that 
RFID tags are cookies for the real world. 
The majority of prior research on RFID deployments addresses how RFID 
can be used to create information about things in the real world. However, RFID is 
also used to create information about people in the real world.  Some people tagging 
is direct and purposeful, but people can also be tagged indirectly by tagging the 
goods that they carry around with them, or are responsible for moving. Because of 
the possibility of tagging individuals, one of the most interesting developments in 
RFID is the potential for using the technology to generate information that can be 
used to monitor the provision of services by contractors. Given the extensive and 
growing proportion of outsourced contracting undertaken by the DoD (U.S. 
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 Department of Defense) and other militaries around the world, it is therefore timely to 
consider the use of RFID technology for monitoring contractors. 
Throughout the paper I assume the reader has a basic knowledge of RFID 
technology, the economics of monitoring, and contracting for services by the military. 
I will not spend any time at all describing these issues, and will instead focus on the 
empirical case studies and survey results. Readers who wish to acquire a basic 
knowledge of RFID might find it useful to refer to Sweeny (2005) and Wyld (2005). 
The economic literature on monitoring is enormous, but among the many 
contributions on this topic the work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) is widely 
regarded as seminal. Service contracting by the military is the topic of an excellent 
recent book by Singer (2003). 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section one explains the basic intuitions 
behind the suggestion that RFID might be used for contractor monitoring.  Section 
two uses a multi-case study methodology to investigate the application of RFID to 
monitoring human subjects in a variety of domains; the objective here is to 
understand the current use of the technology and induce from this some 
understanding of the circumstances under which RFID might be used for contractor 
monitoring.  This is follows by Section three, which investigates the privacy 
implications of monitoring individuals with RFID. It uses an internet survey to gather 
data on privacy preferences among subjects that might be tagged, and applies 
adaptive conjoint analysis to investigate the results of the survey.  Conclusions 
round out the paper. 
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 SECTION I: SOME BASIC INTUITIONS ABOUT THE 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR APPLYING RFID TO THE 
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACTOR MONITORING 
Understanding RFID as a disruptive technology 
In recent years a successful academic mini industry has addressed the 
question of the emergence of new technologies that disrupt existing technologies 
(Christensen, 2000; Danneels, 2004).  A classic example of a technology with the 
characteristics of a disruptive innovation was steel mini mills. Initially, mini-mills 
emerged at the very bottom of the steel market, barely able to meet the quality 
requirements for rebar, a poor quality steel used in building construction.  As a 
result, mini mill technology was of no interest to major steel producers, who used 
superior smelting processes that produced high quality steel with high margins.  
However, mini mills were cheap to build because of their small scale, which was 
appealing to upstart entrepreneurial firms such as Nucor and Chapparel.  These 
firms steadily improved the quality of steel produced by mini-mills, which remained 
low cost. Therefore over time, mini-mills penetrated higher quality steel markets, 
disrupting traditional steel making technologies as they went. Diagram 1 illustrates 
this process:
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A good way to understand the general agenda of this paper starts by placing 
RFID within this basic framework, and considering the possibility that RFID might be 
a disruptive technology (an idea considered by one of Christensen’s collaborators, 
see  Raynor, 2004).  We are already seeing that RFID is disruptive of GPS (global 
satellite positioning) devices in some applications, i.e. some RFID applications 
involve RTLS (real time location monitoring) as a cheap substitute for GPS.  It 
currently has lower performance than GPS and has found an initial customer base in 
market segments that are marginal to mainstream GPS (ex: automobile distribution 
processes), consistent with the pattern observed for disruptive technologies. 
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 In this paper I consider the possibility that RFID might be disruptive of various 
traditional contractor monitoring technologies that are currently employed by DOD. 
There are two key issues to bear in mind when making a realistic assessment of the 
possibility that RFID might emerge as a disruptive monitoring technology.  The first 
is that the value proposition of disruptive technologies is completely different from 
incumbent technologies (Christensen, 2000:32-33).  Disruptive technologies often 
emerge completely outside the mainstream market, looking like there is no way they 
will ever adequately serve mainstream market needs. However, over time, they 
come more and more able to perform in ways that meet the key demands of higher 
end customers, as illustrated in Diagram 1.  The basic intuition here is that disruptive 
technologies initially are unlikely outsiders, but evolve faster than customer 
demands, so they eventually becoming adequate enough in the eyes of customers 
that customers switch from the incumbent technology to the upcoming (disruptive) 
technology.   
At the current point in time, it seems a little imaginative to suggest that RFID 
might have widespread application as a contractor monitoring technology.  However, 
as the case studies in this paper amply illustrate, some organizations are already 
using RFID in a variety of ways that involve direct monitoring of human subjects.  
This is completely consistent with how disruptive technologies emerge, initially in 
non-mainstream applications where they evolve and develop, becoming adequate 
for launching a successful attack on mainstream applications by this process.  It is to 
be noted that many privacy activists seem to see the potential for RFID to be used 
as a pervasive human subjects monitoring technology, and are alarmed by the rate 
of improvement in RFID technology as well as in other elements of the RFID system 
of innovation, such as software that helps sort all of the data generated by RFID into 
usable form (Dew, 2006).  This indicates that at least some stakeholders in RFID 
already see its disruptive potential.  
The second key issue to bear in mind when making a realistic assessment of 
the possibility that RFID might emerge as a disruptive monitoring technology is that 
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 pervasive uncertainty surrounds the evolutionary development of innovations. In this 
regard, a particularly fine paper by Nathan Rosenberg is worth quoting at length: 
I would like to begin with two generally accepted propositions: First, 
technological change is a major ingredient of long-term economic growth, and 
second, technological change is characterized by a high degree of 
uncertainty. Understanding the nature of these uncertainties and the 
obstacles to surmounting them is not a trivial matter. Rather, it goes to the 
heart of how new technologies are devised, how rapidly they diffuse, the 
ultimate extent of that diffusion, and their eventual impact on economic 
performance and welfare. 
In view of the great uncertainties attached to the innovation process, it is 
hardly surprising that innovating firms have, historically, experienced high 
failure rates… But to describe the high failure rate associated with past 
innovation is to tell only a part of the story, and perhaps not the most 
interesting part. Indeed, I want to suggest that the more intriguing part of the 
story… has been the inability to anticipate the future impact of successful 
innovations, even after their technical feasibility has been established. This 
statement remains valid whether we focus on the steam engine 200 years 
ago or on the laser within our own lifetimes. (Rosenberg, 1996:91; italics 
added). 
With an eye for historical generalizability, Rosenberg goes on to delineate 
three key uncertainties about innovations: first, an inability to predict the relative rate 
of improvement among rivalrous technologies; second, an inability to predict key 
complementarities among technologies (i.e. technologies can be analyzed as 
interdependent systems where the performance of the whole depends on 
innovations in the subsystems), and; and third, an inability to predict changes in 
consumer demand.  For all three of these reasons, Rosenberg points out that to map 
the history of innovation is to map a history of great uncertainties.  
Rosenberg’s point is that even when the technological feasibility of an 
innovation is proven – as it surely is for RFID – still few of the consequences of the 
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 innovation in use are foreseen.  My job in this paper is therefore to attempt to pierce 
the fog of uncertainty just a little, in order to evaluate some of the possibilities of 
utilitizing RFID as a contractor monitoring technology. 
RFID possibilities as a monitoring technology 
The intuition that RFID might have some effective applications in contractor 
monitoring arises from several different observations about the possible role of this 
technology given prevailing theories and practices.  I have grouped these 
observations into four categories, as follows: first, mitigating post-contractual 
opportunism; second, substituting human monitoring; third, forensic analysis; and 
fourth, introducing contract alternatives. The following sections of the paper explain 
each of these categories in more detail. 
1. Mitigating post-contractual opportunism 
Information asymmetry is the central feature of a principal-agent models. In 
such scenarios the individual contracting for a service (the principal) commissions 
another individual (the agent) to act on its behalf. However, the principal has 
incomplete information about the agent’s exact goals and behavior (referred to as an 
information asymmetry). Therefore, at least in principle, technologies that generate 
information about the behavior of agents might reduce this information asymmetry 
by making the agent’s actual behavior visible to the principal.  This might be valuable 
to the principal because it seeks to ensure that the agent performs tasks according 
to the principal’s requirements, given the contract terms agreed between the 
principal and agent.  Moreover, agents would modify their behavior because of the 
knowledge that they are being actively monitored by principals, and that this 
monitoring has reduced the asymmetry in information between agent and principal 
compared to the scenarios where no technology is used.  This argument 
straightforwardly suggests that there may be some applications where RFID tagging 
of individuals is value-creating. 
Empirical data confirms that over-billing and short-changing on contract terms 
are endemic in contracting, including in military contracting where firms (agents) are 
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 tempted to increase their profits at their client’s (principal’s) expense, just as they are 
in any other scenario. According to Singer (2003:155): 
Private businesses have cheated public agents during war extending back to the 
Philadelphia merchants who swindled the Revolutionary Army while it starved at 
Valley Forge. The privatized military industry simply represents a new manifestation. 
Now the cheating is also an opportunity on the services side, instead of overcharging 
for goods. 
Singer goes on to catalog several well-known examples of what economists 
refer to as “ex-post rent extraction” or “opportunism” by firms, i.e. over-billing or short 
changing their clients after the ink has dried on their contracts, including “padding” 
staff numbers with “shadow” employees (p.156), citing data from the GAO (General 
Accounting Office) among others (p.157). DynCorp and BRS are both cited by 
Singer; more recently BRS has also been investigated for over-billing on contracts in 
Iraq.   
One obvious way of ensuring that you get more of what you pay for is to 
effectively monitor the provision of services with technology.  RFID is one technology 
that is suited to such applications. For example, a RAND study on RFID in the 
workplace (Balkovich et al, 2005) found that some firms are using RFID-generated 
information to police working hours rules in white-collar office environments, i.e. 
collecting precise data on employee attendance. Some universities have also started 
using RFID to automatically collect data on class attendance by students (more on 
this later in the paper). These and other examples comprise proof-of-concept that 
RFID tagging might be used to precisely monitor the presence of agents on site, 
including the activity of agents by tracking their movement around sites.   
At first sight this seems like a very mundane use for a sophisticated 
technology, but initial impressions underestimate the powerful surveillance potential 
of RFID (Stepleton-Grey, 2005).  A system of distributed RFID readers is a powerful 
way to invisibly oversee the whereabouts and activities of individual subjects in any 
particular location.  Furthermore, RFID tags can be equipped to include motion 
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 sensors and other devices that add additional surveillance potential to basic 
identify/location features. 
2. Substituting human monitoring 
A second intuition about the potential role that RFID might have some 
contractor monitoring applications arises from shifts in the relative prices of labor 
versus technology.  In short, RFID is getting much cheaper (and its costs are more 
predictable), whereas labor is getting steadily more expensive (and future fully built-
up costs are less predictable).  Although the pace of relative change in these cost 
variables remains to some extent uncertain, the general direction of the trend is 
sufficiently clear that it is possible to say that RFID monitoring is likely to steadily 
substitute monitoring by human subjects. 
There are additional reasons why this trend is likely to be especially important 
in military environments.  First, the military currently faces enormous pressure to 
reduce its immediate overall manpower requirements, both in order to reduce its 
total budgeted costs, and to adjust to lower recruitment levels.  These pressures to 
generally reduce manpower requirements have the consequence that back office 
staff (the kind that normally would be involved in monitoring contract compliance) are 
being steadily reduced, even as the contract supervision workload is steadily 
increasing.  This creates a gap in the military’s ability to monitor contractors.  One 
logical means of filling this gap is to use available technology, such as RFID.  Even if 
the information created by the technology is rudimentary in its current state of 
development, it creates an auditable data trail.  Manpower-related pressures serve 
to overcome some of the  inertia that normally accompanies the adoption of new 
technologies in large organizations such as the DoD, and in particular the resistance 
to adopt technologies that may initially seem to under-perform on some metrics 
(more on this in the conclusion to this paper).   
Second, given the business military organizations are in, the safety and 
security of all staff has to be taken into account.  Despite the obvious need for 
contractor monitoring in dangerous and unstable environments (take Fallujah, for 
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 example) there are equally obvious reasons for minimizing the number of personnel 
involved in any kind of monitoring activities is these danger zones.  As the threat to 
the safety and security of personnel increases, the costs of maintaining adequate 
safety and security increase, and these costs have to be traded-off against the value 
that can be gained by actively monitoring contractor activities.  It is probably not just 
coincidence that some of the charges of contractor opportunism (such as recent 
ones against subsidiaries of Haliburton working in the Fallujah area) occur in areas 
that are dangerous and unsavory places to go just to ensure contractors are 
delivering on their contracts.  Contractors understand these trade-offs very well, and 
may take advantage of them (i.e. behave opportunistically).  Once again, even if the 
information created by RFID technology is rudimentary in its current state of 
development, it creates an auditable data trail that is better than no data at all in 
reducing the costs of opportunism. 
As a result, RFID is one of a suite of technologies that may be favored by 
military units with responsibility for contractor monitoring in order that some form of 
monitoring may be done remotely, from safe and secure locations. This is no 
different from security guards using sensors, access systems and video surveillance 
to monitor building security from remote locations. 
3. Forensic analysis 
Using RFID for forensic analysis refers to the post hoc use of data gathered 
by RFID systems for investigative purposes.  According to RAND (2005:12), “a 
typical use might be investigation of asset theft or of compliance with company 
timekeeping policies.”  Following from the previous section, where I highlighted the 
often rudimentary nature of RFID data, even if the information created by the 
technology is rudimentary it creates an auditable data trail.  The important point that 
follows from this is that it enables exception monitoring to be conducted on a post 
hoc basis, and this in turn enables the threat of contract monitoring to be made 
credibly.  Even if most contracts are not monitored, a credible threat of monitoring 
will be sufficient to enforce compliance, up to a certain point. In principle this is no 
different from any other form of policing.  For instance, criminal enforcement relies 
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 on the threat of being caught (probabilistically) rather than on penalties of certain 
detection.  However, once a suspect is in hand, forensic data can help enormously 
in prosecuting a case just because ex post an individual’s behavior can be 
reconstructed from a variety of data.  In the same way, RFID can provides a 
rudimentary data trace that can be valuable for forensic purposes, just as the RAND 
study highlights. 
To illustrate the power of RFID in forensic applications, consider the following 
example.  Sysco, the largest distributor of temperature-controlled food, is testing a 
semi-passive RFID system to identify, locate and track individual trailers as they 
move through the supply chain, and to monitor and record at regular intervals the 
temperature conditions inside refrigerated trailers.  Upon delivery, the tags are 
handed to the customer, who can then interrogate them to inspect the temperature 
log before accepting the shipment. Temperature monitoring supports quality by 
assuring the customer that the goods were kept at the correct temperature through 
the supply chain. Ultimately, this also saves costs by providing the ability to detect 
which party was responsible for losses; this, in turn, reduces the costs of moral 
hazard and reduces insurance premiums.  
Because post hoc forensic analysis can only be done if relevant data has 
been collected, it may make economic sense to utilize cheap technologies that 
capture data on a range of variables, even if the data is only used on a contingent 
basis.  This kind of contingent application of RFID is most powerful when different 
kinds of data about contractor performance is captured and linked to other variables 
in the course of investigation. 
4. Introducing pricing alternatives 
The final potential role for RFID in contractor monitoring applications that I 
highlight here arises from RFID’s capability of generating numerous new measures 
of processes.  Measurement data has value because the rational design of contracts 
depends on costs of measurement (as well as bargaining and enforcement, as 
outlined in transaction cost economics – see Coase, 1937; Foss and Foss, 2005).  
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 Because RFID introduces cost-effective alternative means of measuring activities 
(such as assembly processes or the consumption of services) it therefore may 
create value by allowing contracts to be measured more efficiently by the principal or 
redesigned in ways that are more efficient for the principal (i.e. DoD). 
An example of RFID’s potential as a measurement system – and the re-
pricing opportunities that come with that – is Michelin’s use of semi-passive RFID 
tags for smart tires. Smart tires allow leasers to identify individual tires and monitor 
tire operating conditions such as distance run, pressure and temperature at regular 
intervals, thus accumulating historical data on tire use. For the tire owner, this helps 
the enforcement of tire-leasing contracts by collecting information on tire abuse by 
users of the tires. Consequently, smart tires bring a number of benefits to vehicle 
fleet operators and tire owners.  They are easier to manage since RFID helps in the 
development of fair tire leasing contracts with efficient consumption measures. This 
data tracking reduces the conflicts between supplier and buyer by ensuring that the 
tires operate at proper parameters. 
Because the relative cost of negotiating/enforcing versus measuring, the 
optimal mix of contract provisions would almost certainly change if cheap RFID-
based measurement technology was widely available.  Changes in relative 
measurement costs would make some contract types look more attractive versus 
alternatives, and therefore the equilibrium mix of contract provisions would change.  
This trend is already emerging in the insurance industry, where auto insurance 
companies are piloting Pay-As-You-Drive insurance schemes that replace annually 
priced insurance contracts with monthly variable-price contracts.
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 SECTION II: RFID AS A MONITORING 
TECHNOLOGY: CASE EXAMPLES 
Where did the idea of directly tagging people come from?  
RFID technology has evolved over many decades to the point where it is 
currently emerging as a general purpose identification technology used in a very 
wide range of applications.  The idea of tagging people directly can be traced 
through two evolutionary pathways: animal tagging and entry systems. 
Animal tagging 
Like several other significant technologies (high performance avionics, 
integrated circuits, computer software) many of the important research and 
development breakthroughs for RFID were sponsored by branches of the U.S. 
government. In the mid 1970s the USDA (Department of Agriculture) asked LASL 
(Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory) to develop RFID tagging to identify and track 
livestock (initially cattle). The problem the researchers were asked to tackle was how 
to identify cattle so that the animals could be given hormones and medicines 
(Roberti 2005). LASL came up with low frequency (125 khz) passive RFID tagging 
system that used a transponder encapsulated in glass that was injected into cattle, 
i.e. subcutaneously.  In the U.S. commercialization of this technology was spawned 
by the transfer, in 1977, of government-developed technology through LASL initially 
to two private firms: Amtech and Identronix (both of which survive as subsidiaries of 
larger firms).  Cattle tagging subsequently became one of the first major markets for 
RFID (mainly in Europe, more recently in the U.S., following the BSE scare in 2004). 
This later evolved into tagging other animals, including household pets.  Rice grain 
size implantable microchips identify over one million pets in the U.S., and over 10 
million in Europe.   
Unsurprisingly, it was only a matter of time before subcutaneous RFID 
implants in human subjects started to appear, initially using tags originally designed 
for pets.  At least one implantable RFID device has received FDA approval and there 
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 have been several high profile articles about tagging human subjects with 
subcutaneous RFID tags.  I will not describe any of these applications in detail here, 
but the reader should be aware that these tags are already being used for security-
oriented applications. 
Entry systems 
A second direction from which RFID tagging of human subjects emerged is 
entry systems.  The path of evolution here was from key-based systems, through 
magnetic stripe cards, and onto RFID-based contactless cards used in entry 
systems. According to a study by RAND (Balkovich et al, 2005) these systems have 
been in use since at least 1995.  In fact, the original application patent for RFID-
based entry systems was granted in 1973 to Charles Walton, who received a patent 
for using RFID to unlock doors and subsequently licensed it to several firms.  As 
microchips costs declined in the 1990s, applications for RFID began to spring up in 
access systems for office buildings and keyless entry systems for cars (which made 
up approximately half of worldwide deliveries of RFID transponders in 2000).  It is 
now commonplace for office entry systems to feature RFID-enabled identification 
badges and key chains. 
Case studies of RFID applied to human subjects monitoring 
In this section of the paper I use the same multi-case methodology as used 
by Apte et al (2006), i.e. a multi-case study that aims to discover how RFID is 
already being used in applications that involve directly or indirectly tagging individual 
human subjects. 
The logic behind this multi-case methodology is that there is substantial 
variation in RFID applications and the use of RFID technology in business/military 
applications is quite recent. This makes case research an appropriate methodology 
to use in the context of investigating the relationship between RFID and a new topic 
of interest: contractor monitoring.  This methodology lends itself well to early, 
exploratory investigations where the variables are still unknown and the 
phenomenon not well understood.  As argued by Meredith (1998), an emergent 
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 phenomenon can be studied in its natural setting with case research, and a 
meaningful, relevant theory can be generated based on the understanding 
developed through observing actual practice. 
When building theory from case studies, it is possible to select cases using 
alternate approaches of sampling or replication. (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994).  
Since the goal of the research at hand is to develop practical / managerial guidelines 
for the possible use of RFID technology in the domain of contractor monitoring, I use 
the former approach to understand how RFID is used for human subjects tagging 
across a spectrum of applications. 
Cases were selected as follows.  I started with a database of public sources 
of information on RFID which encompasses several thousand documents collected 
in the 2002-2006 period.  From this database I initially screened 27 possible cases 
that involved direct human subjects tagging (rather than object tagging, which is a 
much more common application of RFID).  Out of this subgroup, I then selected 6 
cases for detailed study, based on their appropriateness for exploring the possibility 
of RFID-based contractor monitoring.  Table 1 details the 27 cases screened and 
identifies the 6 cases selected for further study with a * and highlighting. 
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 Table 1: RFID cases screened 
Tracking applications 
*  Aircraft manufacturing: assembly tracking tag  
*  Student tracking: recording class attendance 
*  Timekeeping tags for sporting events 
*  Tracking grocery store shopper behavior 
Manufacturing plants: clocking in and out 
Vehicle entry systems: Fedex RFID wristbands 
Semiconductor manufacturing: tagged bunnysuits  
MountainWatch ski resort tagging 
Security applications 
*  Inmates tagging in prisons 
Home arrest tags 
Office entry systems 
Identifying critical people: subcutaneous human tags (Mexico) 
School kids anti-abduction tags 
Theme park tags: Legoland kids “lost and found” tagging 
Mine and tunnel worker tagging 
Oak Ridge Evacuation and Rescue system 
BP Cherry Point refinery worker tracking (emergencies) 
LKAB (Sweden) iron ore mine worker tracking (safety during blasting) 
Medical applications 
*  SARS patient tracking tags (Singapore) 
Hospital visitor tags 
Navy medical dogtags (TACMEDS) 
“Digital Angel” subcutaneous identity tag for elderly 
Verichip implants for accessing medical records 
Newborn anti-abduction systems 
Patient tags: Alzheimer’s patients access control tags (Japan) 
Mortuary tracking bodies (post Hurricane Katrina)  
Convenience applications 
Implanted tag for wallet-less payments (nightclubs in the UK, Spain, Mexico) 
 
Case 1: aircraft assembly processes 
Lockheed Martin has been using RFID to track aircraft assembly work for 
several years at three of its plants (Dallas-Fort Worth, TX, Marrietta, GA and 
Palmdale, CA). It does this by placing RFID smart-card readers on manufacturing 
equipment and workstations throughout its plants.  Before a worker uses any of the 
equipment they must use their RFID-enabled ID card to authorize access to the 
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 equipment.  A computer system then records every authorization event as a 
transaction, and keeps a record of all of the processes performed by the employee 
using the equipment.  
One reason Lockheed switched to the RFID-enabled system is that it 
removes redundant tasks for workers and thus promotes efficiencies.  For instance, 
workers used to have to swipe their magnetic stripe cards through a reader; with the 
RFID system they only have to wave the card close by the reader. This removes 
actions that do not add value in the assembly process.  At the same time, the RFID-
enabled system allows Lockheed to remove many manual record keeping processes 
that required human interventions, thus substituting electronic records for manual 
ones. 
A second reason Lockheed adopted RFID was for quality assurance 
purposes. Given the type of manufacturing the firm is involved in, it is critical that it 
(the agent) can closely monitor the assembly process to ensure its customers (the 
principals) that work was performed to specification, i.e. to be able to provide data 
that proves quality. For example, Lockheed assembles kits that go into the 
production line for aircraft that have in the range of 20-100 sub-components and 
may be customized “one offs”. Because the opportunity for mis-assembly is large, 
very detailed monitoring of the assembly process is necessary. 
Case 2: SARs patient tracking in Singapore 
When SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) broke out in the Far East 
in 2003, two Singapore hospitals started using RFID tagging in order to track 
visitors, patients and staff, so they could trace all of the people with whom a 
suspected SARS patient has had contact. 
The system worked by issuing identity cards embedded with an active RFID 
tag with a small battery to patients, visitors and staff.  Everyone issued with a card 
had to register their name and contact information in case it was necessary to 
contact them later. RFID readers were placed around hospital facilities, which were 
divided into zones, with one reader in every zone. 
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 The purpose of the system was to allow instant forensic analysis to be done: 
if a patient was suspected of having SARS, staff were able to run an instant check of 
who else had contact with the patient, where and when. The system stored all this 
data for 21 days which was thought to be long enough based on the fact that SARS 
has an incubation period of 10 days. For confidentiality reasons, the data was 
deleted after that period. 
Besides its forensic analysis capabilities, another benefit of the RFID system 
was the ability to track everyone in the hospital without requiring manual staff 
intervention, i.e. the system substituted human monitoring processes. 
Case 3: Timekeeping in sporting events 
Starting with the Boston marathon in 1996, RFID has become a standard 
measurement technology for sporting events around the world.  Literally thousands 
of athletic events have used RFID tags attached to runners’ shoes to time 
participants in marathons and other sporting events in every corner of the globe, 
from Beirut to Bangkok to Boston. Skiers have also been tagged, including 
participants in the 2002 Winter Olympics.  
From 1999 Boston marathon organizers began enabling friends, family and 
other spectators to monitor the progress of runners on the Internet, as well as 
accurately time them for official race purposes. Every runner has an RFID tag tied 
into the shoelaces.  The tag contains a unique ID assigned to that athlete, and when 
they runs over RFID-receiving mats on the raceway the system logs the runner's 
time at that point into a database. 
Given this information, race organizers can track the progress of runners and 
even forecast when they will finish the race, based on information about time 
differences between when each runner crosses the mats. 
This information is also made available to the press and public. Boston 
marathon organizers even arranged for 75 volunteers to wander the crowds with 
wireless PDAs (personal digital assistants) answering questions and provide location 
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 information to spectators. Friends and families of runners could log onto the Internet, 
check times and even set up an automatic alert based on the predicted time a friend 
is going to finish the race.  More than 180,000 alert messages were sent in 2002, the 
first year the system was available, and in 2004 the system served up more than 7 
million web page views. 
Case 4: RFID in prisons 
RFID has emerged as a popular technology for tracking the movements of 
inmates in prisons.  Calipatria State Prison, CA was the first jail in the U.S. to adopt 
RFID tracking for inmates in 2000.  Since that time correctional facilities in Michigan, 
Illinois and Ohio have also adopted the technology for 3,000 inmates.  In 2005 the 
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department launched a pilot covering 1,800 inmates, 
with plans to eventually apply the technology across the whole county, covering 
18,000 inmates.  
RFID inmate monitoring works by issuing every inmate a bracelet that has an 
active RFID tag embedded in it. The bracelet carries the inmate's identity number 
and is referenced to personal information contained in the prison’s database, 
including data that “profiles” the inmate along certain dimensions, i.e. restricts 
him/her to certain parts of the jail, sets up "keep away" alarms from other particular 
inmates, etc.  The bracelet sends out a RFID signal every two seconds, and includes 
tamper-proof safeguards such as a braided stainless steel wire that runs the length 
of the bracelet (if cut the tag stops transmitting, which triggers an alarm) and a skin 
contact sensor (if removed for more than 15 seconds, this also sets off an alarm). 
Readers through the prison complex continuously log signals received from 
inmates’ bracelets and rely this data to a control center where prison guards monitor 
inmate behavior on a screen depicting the floor plan of the facility. This allows guard 
to pinpoint the location of staff and prisoners in real-time within the facility. Officers 
can monitor inmate movements, including congregations of up to 20 inmates. 
Guards wear bracelet’s that also have an emergency button on them to set off a 
rescue call. 
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 The inmate tracking system is thought to have several benefits in addition to 
its chief purpose of protecting correctional officers: prison costs are reduced 
because inmates know they can be placed at the scene of an incident, such as theft, 
property damage, violence against other inmates and escape attempts. 
Case 5: student class attendance 
Several examples exist of RFID being used in schools and universities to 
monitor students for either security (kidnap prevention) or attendance monitoring.  
One example is the RFID system tested at Brittan Elementary School in Sutter, CA 
in 2005. The school tested a system that automates attendance-taking by placing 
RFID readers on classroom doorways and giving students passive RFID tags with a 
unique 15 digit identity number embedded in student identity cards. The system was 
of interest to the school district because California bases school aid upon 
attendance numbers, which puts a priority on fast, low cost, reliable monitoring of 
student attendance.  The idea was that RFID monitoring could decrease the amount 
of time teachers spend taking attendance manually. 
As piloted at Brittan, the system kept a record of students present, absent and 
tardy, based on the student’s time of entry into the classroom.  This data was 
wirelessly uploaded to a PDA issued to the teacher, who then performed a quick 
visual check to verify class attendance. Once confirmed, the list was then 
electronically filed with school administrators, and from there to the state board of 
education.  
Japan and the U.S. have led the adoption of RFID for student tracking. 
However, the Brittan initiative and others like it have been shelved after nationwide 
media attention on the issue of privacy invasion (a subject we will return to later in 
this paper). 
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 Case 6: tracking shopper behavior 
One novel use of RFID for tracking human subjects involves tracking 
shoppers’ traffic patterns in grocery stores, which has been undertaken by at least 
one retail market research firm in 20 stores throughout the U.S. since 2001.  
Using an RFID technology known as RTLS (real time location system) every 
grocery cart in a supermarket had an active RFID tag placed on it. The tags emit a 
signal once every five seconds, which is received by RFID readers in the store, 
which triangulate the precise location of the cart and therefore track the grocery 
cart’s route through the entire store, using the cart’s path as a proxy for the actual 
shoppers’ path. The result is an in-store version of GPS (global satellite positioning) 
system.  
The data is then aggregated, visually mapped and statistically analyzed in 
order to understand typical shopping patterns (Larson et al, 2005). Retailers have 
long-standing beliefs about how consumers move around stores, i.e. ideas about 
how customers move around aisles, promotional displays and the perimeter of 
stores. However, Larson et al’s (2005) analysis of actual shopper patterns 
challenges many long-standing perceptions of shopper behavior, including: 
o The belief that grocery shoppers weave up and down all aisles: instead, most 
shoppers actually travel select aisles. 
o The belief that shoppers shop a whole aisle: instead, most shoppers actually 
do short excursions in and out of select aisles. 
o The belief that the perimeter of a store (nicknamed the “racetrack”) was only 
visited as a way of getting access to the aisles: instead, the racetrack is 
actually the main thoroughfare of the store. 
This method of monitoring shopper movements represents a significant step forward 
in understanding the shopping paths taken by individual shoppers in actual stores, 
with potentially important implications for overall store design as well as the 
placement of sale items, etc. 
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 Synthesizing the case studies 
The basic message that arises from these six case studies of RFID 
applications is that direct human subjects monitoring using RFID is actually already 
happening in several different ways, and that the value of monitoring is derived 
along at least four dimensions, as outlined earlier in this paper: by mitigating 
opportunism, substituting human monitoring, through forensic analysis, or by 
generating new processes measures upon which contract pricing alternatives can be 
based.  These dimensions are tabulated in Table 2 (on page 31) along with other 
key characteristics of the RFID technologies considered here. 
While no one classification scheme can adequately describe the key 
characteristics of a technology, multi-case studies like the one presented here – 
when combined with other studies of a similar kind (see Apte et al, 2006) - help to 
generate new knowledge about RFID by providing taxonomies that are useful for 
practitioners who want to understand how RFID might be applied, as well as being 
useful for academics who seek to understand the underlying drivers of value of a 
technology in applications. 
A complimentary way of illustrating the potential value of RFID monitoring is 
through analogy. 
Take the example of shopping carts, for instance.  What reason do we have 
to believe that there is any less “widely accepted folklore” (Larson et al, 2005) about 
contractor behavior than there is about shopper behavior?  If RFID tagging of 
shopping carts can help reveal empirical data on true shopper behavior, isn’t it also 
at least plausible to think that it can help reveal empirical data on true contractor 
behavior? 
Next, taking the example of tracking marathon runners.  If it is possible to 
create a low cost way of timing athletes in sporting events, and make that 
information available wirelessly to a PDA and through the internet, why wouldn’t 
there also be value in applying the same technology to contractors, and make the 
information similarly available to a large number of potential monitoring agents. This 
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 would a) make it more likely opportunistic behavior was detected, and b) create 
social pressure not to behave opportunistically, which is a well-known effect of 
“publishing” behavior. Couldn’t the same technology be applied to the problem of 
“who’s watching the nightwatchman?” 
To take a third example, consider the role that monitoring plays in changing 
the behavior of prison inmates: prison costs are reduced because inmates know 
they can be placed at the scene of an incident, such as theft, property damage, as 
well as violence against other inmates and escape attempts. In principle, are not 
exactly the same monitoring benefits available to discourage the worst abuses DoD 
property and equipment by contractors?  If RFID bracelets are useful for ensuring 
that inmates do not “double dip” in the cafeteria, isn’t it also possible that it would be 
a useful way of making sure that contractor’s don’t double dip the DoD, in whatever 
form that might take? 
The point here is not to suggest that DoD contractors are all crooks, and 
should be treated like inmates.  Instead, the point is exactly the one that Williamson 
(1985) famously made about opportunism: the monitoring problem exists not 
because every agent will cheat, if possible; instead, it exists because ex ante the 
principal does not know which agents will cheat; therefore monitoring must be done 
with an eye to deterring cheating among all agents.  That may mean that RFID can 
play a role in increasing contracting efficiencies.
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 SECTION III: WILL THEY WEAR IT? – PRIVACY 
ISSUES 
Any realistic assessment of the prospects of RFID as a general purpose 
monitoring technology must take into account the obstacles to monitoring people, i.e. 
privacy invasion.  Therefore a large part of the research that this paper reports on 
has involved exploring this issue empirically through an internet survey that used 
conjoint analysis to find out how much value individuals place on their privacy. 
The practical importance of this issue struck me during a meeting with SAVI 
technologies.  SAVI executives commented that in Iraq truck drivers routinely use 
bolt cutters to cut off RFID tags from supplies they are transporting, for fear that the 
RFID device might be used by insurgents as a trigger for improvised explosive 
devices (roadside bombs) or might act as ready-made homing devices for shoulder-
fired missiles.  What this anecdote highlighted was the fact that all RFID tagging of 
human subjects relies on a hidden assumption: that people will wear the tags.  
However, particularly in military contexts, this assumption may be false. 
Privacy issues raised by RFID technology has in fact been the focal point of 
much recent public debate.  I will not delve into this debate in great detail here, as I 
consider it outside the scope of this study. Instead, I simply highlight the following 
points: 
• Two major books on RFID privacy issues were published in 2005:  Simson 
Garfinkel’s “RFID: Applications, Security, and Privacy” (Garfinkel and 
Rosenberg, 2005) and Katherine Albretch’s “Spychips” (Albretch, 2005).  
• The December 2004 edition of Harvard Business Review carried a case study 
on RFID privacy issues 
• RAND completed a study of RFID in the workplace in 2005 (Balkovich et al, 
2005) 
• The GAO (General Accounting Office) issued a report on RFID privacy issues 
in May 2005 (GAO, 2005).  Among other points the report made, it pointed 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 27- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 out that legislation on privacy issues relating to RFID was under consideration 
in six different states. 
• In March 2005 Benetton was the target of a successful boycott after 
announcing it planned to introduce RFID tagging on some of its clothing.  The 
firm was forced to withdraw its plans. 
• Some large corporations – among them Proctor and Gamble being most 
prominent – have appointed “Privacy Officers” to their executive boards. 
• In the Fall of 2005 the General Workers Union in the U.K. announced the 
results of a study conducted by the University of Durham (U.K.) which found 
that hundred of thousands of logistics workers were already being indirectly 
monitored using RFID. The union called for an immediate ban of such 
monitoring and began proceedings to take the issue of RFID monitoring 
through the European Community legal process, with the aim of having the 
technology banned. 
• At a broader level, RFID monitoring is just one aspect of wider concerns 
about information privacy which have been raised by the Internet.  Beyond 
this, there is a long history of constitutional safeguards in the U.S. and other 
countries that protect individual’s rights to privacy, as well as an extensive 
literature on privacy-related topics in philosophy, politics and economics. 
Perhaps because RFID is still emerging as a mainstream technology, it 
seems that there is little research-quality empirical data on RFID and privacy issues 
(though there is a research literature addressing general privacy issues – for 
example Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005; Camp and Lewis, 2004; Stigler, 1980). 
Given the obvious importance of the privacy issue in any practical contractor 
monitoring application of RFID, I therefore decided to create a survey instrument that 
would allow some analysis of individual preferences for privacy in the workplace. 
The survey 
An Internet-based survey instrument was used for data collection (the 
complete survey can be viewed online at http://www.imdresearch.ch/id_survey/).  
The survey was in two parts: 
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 o Part 1 collected descriptive data on participants, covering commonly collected 
demographic variables such as gender, group affiliations, military rank, etc.   
o Part 2 presented respondents with a fictitious (though realistic) military ID 
(identification) system, and asked respondents to rate how desirable it would 
be to be able to use the proposed ID system in certain ways – for example, 
ranging from “Not Desirable” and “Somewhat Desirable” to “Very Desirable” 
and “Extremely Desirable”. 
The survey instrument was “adaptive” in the sense that early responses 
“channeled” respondents into relevant future questions, rather than having every 
respondent fill out every aspect of the survey (this economizes on respondents’ time 
and eliminates redundant data).  The survey was designed and administrated by two 
marketing research experts at the IMD business school in Lausanne, Switzerland. 
The sample used for this study was 55 students enrolled in defense-oriented 
resident and executive MBA programs. Participation was anonymous.  Nearly all 
respondents had military careers.  28 students responded, giving a response rate of 
approximately 50%. It should be noted that the sample was a “convenience” sample 
made up of career military individuals rather than contractors.  Therefore, while there 
are some reasons for thinking that the basic demographics are representative of 
contractor demographics, caution must be exercised in interpreting the results of the 
survey since there may be systematic differences between this sample and a 
representative sample of DoD contractors.  This issue clearly should be subjected to 
further empirical study. 
The procedure followed in administrating the survey was as follows.  First, we 
created a test survey featuring an RFID-tagged pharmaceutical product in order to 
examine the potential impact of RFID on privacy.  Given the initial results of this 
survey, we developed a new survey specifically oriented to military ID tagging in the 
workplace.  We sent the sample of respondents a short email requesting their 
participation in a survey, with a link to the survey website embedded in the email for 
their convenience.  We estimate the survey took approximately 20 minutes for each 
respondent to complete.  A week after the first email, we sent a follow-up email, 
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 again requesting participation.  The number of completed surveys was based on 
these two solicitations only.  Participation was voluntary; no rewards were offered. 
We analyzed the survey results using common statistical methods. Subjects’ 
overall ranking of features of the ID tag system (relative utility levels) were as 
follows: 
Table 3: summary survey data 
Keeping record of presence through your ID 7.50 
Entry and access through ID system 9.63 
Flexibility in choosing features 11.59 
Form of the ID system 11.64 
Ability for others find you through your ID 12.13 
Use as a payment system 14.28 
  
The first result that appears from the survey is that the least preferred feature 
of the ID tag system was keeping a record of an individual’s presence through the ID 
system, which is exactly what an ID tag for monitoring individual behavior is 
designed to do.  Importantly, this confirms the intuition most people have that 
tracking individual movement for “business” purposes conflicts at some basic level 
with individual preferences for privacy.  The most preferred feature of the ID tag was 
the ability to use it as a payment system, a feature that benefits the tag wearer (the 
employee, or contractor), not the employer.  The relative ranking of other features 
lay in between these two extremes.  For practicing DoD managers these results 
suggest that ID tagging policy needs to be formulated with an eye to the possible 
“benefits” (to contractors) as well as the “costs” (in terms of privacy invasion).  ID 
tags could be made much more acceptable to contractors if they are “packaged” as 
a combination of features, rather than simply as a tracking device.   
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 Within these overall results, we asked additional questions about more 
specific features of the fictitious ID system.  In the following Table, more detailed 
survey results are presented. 
Table 4: detailed survey results 
Keeping record of presence through your ID   
Time Period Location  
Working Hours Immediate Workplace 9.36
Working Hours Any work-facility 3.55
After-work hours Immediate Workplace 1.76
After-work hours Any work-facility 1.86
All hours Immediate Workplace -3.89
All hours Any work-facility -10.11
   
Entry and access through ID system   
Work related buildings  21.44
Work and other base facilities  14.11
Personal work area or office  -3.48
Access to work, base facilities, household  -32.07
   
Flexibility in choosing features    
Workplace Features All other features 
All are off, can opt-in all are off, can opt-in 32.04
Automatically on all are off, can opt-in 9.11
Automatically on all are on, can opt-out -6.21
Automatically on all are on, cannot opt out -34.94
   
Form of the ID system   
Card or keychain to be carried at all times  29.13
Within bracelet or necklace to be worn at all times  -1.69
Within a mobile phone or PDA carried at all times  2.35
Sewn into uniforms  -3.99
Within a bracelet--alarm sounds if removed  -22.11
   
Ability for others find you through your ID   
Public Places Household  
Automatically off, can opt-in Automatically off, can opt-in 38.17
Automatically on, but only for emergency services Automatically off, can opt-in 25.98
Automatically on, cannot opt-out Automatically on, can opt out -30.65
Automatically on, cannot opt-out Automatically on, cannot opt-out -33.50
   
Use as a payment system   
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 A second key result rises from Table 4:  flexibility in choosing features and 
the form of the ID system were important to subjects.  For instance, there are big 
differences in subjects’ preferences over a system that has opt in/out features 
versus a system where there is no opt out option.  Similarly, subjects showed a 
strong aversion to a system based on non-removable ID bracelets, and a strong 
preference for a card/keychain-based ID tag.  In both cases, the ability to remove the 
tag or opt out gives the subject some control over the times at which they are 
tracked/monitored.  The implication for DoD policy makers is once again that the 
way an ID tagging system is “packaged” for contractors is likely to have important 
implications for how much contractors resist ID tagging schemes on privacy 
grounds.  Giving people some control over ID tagging significantly increases their 
preference for ID tagging. 
Of course, one drawback of a survey of this type is that it traces espoused 
preferences rather than revealed preferences, and research on privacy-related 
behavior does give us reason to believe that there might be differences between the 
two (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005).  So, like all survey results, these ones must be 
interpreted with suitable qualifications.  On the positive side, the survey helps us 
better understand privacy preferences and some of the trade-offs individuals are 
willing to make by allowing us to measure espoused preferences using utility scores, 
which helps us understand the relative weight subjects put on different features of an 
ID tag.  With this information in hand, DoD policy makers are in a better position to 
make informed decisions regarding the best way of introducing ID tagging as a tool 
for monitoring contractors.  To reiterate my earlier statement: RFID tagging will only 
generate information if contractors wear the tags; so if DoD ever intend to use RFID 
tagging to monitor contractors, the system must be introduced in a way that is 
tolerable to the individuals who will be monitored. 
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 CONCLUSION 
To conclude this paper, I want to very briefly outline, first, research challenges 
that lay ahead and, second, some practical managerial issues that I see as relevant. 
By future research needs, I mean research that addresses the question of 
“What do we need to find out about RFID?” in order that we can make better 
decisions about how we deploy the technology.  One key question that needs 
researching is “How much does contractor behavior actually change when RFID 
monitoring is introduced?”.  To answer this question requires a study design that 
looks at behavior pre/post RFID monitoring, or contrasts two similar sites, one that 
has implementing RFID monitoring and one without.   
Modeling might also help here. In the economic literature, monitoring is 
traditionally been modeled as a conflict between agents and principals, where 
information asymmetries are essential for agents to eek out some room for private 
maneuver and gain, and principles try to either close information gaps through 
monitoring or to align incentives in such a way that agents will behave in the 
interests of principles.  All these issues are present in RFID monitoring, however 
they are also overlaid by another set of issues: security and privacy. In order to 
increase their private security, agents may willingly wear tags, but in order to 
preserve their privacy they seek commitments that safeguards are being followed 
regarding the collection and dissemination of information about them.  Thus, 
modified principal-agent models that address the space that exists for deals to be 
made that suit both principals and agents might be helpful here. 
A third researchable issue is the question of “How much RFID is enough?” In 
order to monitor contracts effectively, one does not need to monitor everything.  This 
raises two points.  First, sampling using RFID might be enough. For instance, CHEP 
(a supplier of pallets in logistics operations) does not have to tag all its pallets in 
order to gather population level data: it can just tag a sample of them, and 
generalize the data collected to the population. Second, there is the question of 
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 precisely what data is collected. The key idea here is “thin-slicing”, i.e. the notion 
that just a thin slice of the overall data is enough to monitor / predict the behavior of 
the population. So, it may only be necessary to electronically monitor a few critical 
attributes of contractor performance in order for a monitoring system to add 
significant value. 
For practicing DoD managers / policy makers, it seems to me that two key 
questions are fundamental to any decisions regarding RFID contractor monitoring.  
The first is the relative cost of using RFID.  This will depend on the evolutionary path 
taken by the technology as well as that taken by other technologies, or alternative 
methods for achieving the same ends.  Much may also depend on innovations in 
complementary technologies, such as cheap software and hardware for gathering, 
storing and analyzing huge quantities of RFID-generated data.  Tag and reader 
costs are falling dramatically, and there are good reasons for thinking that these 
costs will continue to fall.  At some point, it’s at least plausible to suggest that RFID 
will begin to “disrupt” other monitoring technologies, though probably in ways that 
seem “inferior” to present ways of doing things. 
Finally, there is the question of how the law will evolve on privacy-related 
issues, as well as bargaining between DoD and its contractors. The shape in which 
RFID monitoring eventually emerges will depend on how the institutional framework 
comprising the law and associated institutional elements evolves.  A recent GAO 
report (Wilshusen, 2005) has highlighted the legal ambiguities surrounding privacy 
and RFID, concluding that legal uncertainty was one reason why many government 
departments – both at the federal and state level – were not pushing forward with 
RFID-enabled projects, such as “chipped” driver’s licenses, “tagged” files, etc.  
Departments are “biding their time” until a more definitive framework of legal rules 
emerges.  This is a good example of how “soft” institutional elements can 
significantly influence the pattern of evolution of innovations like RFID.  Like 
everyone else, DoD practitioners will need to wait, anticipate, and take actions to 
shape the legal framework before RFID contractor monitoring can become any kind 
of reality.
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